A pitfall of expectational stability (E-stability) analysis can arise in models with multiperiod expectations: if an auxiliary variable is introduced as substitute for an expectational endogenous variable in such a model, this shrinks the region of the model parameters that guarantee E-stability of a fundamental rational expectations equilibrium. Moreover, in the model representation with no auxiliary variable, the same E-stability region as in that with the auxiliary variable is obtained if economic agents are assumed to make multiple forecasts in an inconsistent manner. Therefore, we argue that the introduction of an auxiliary variable as substitute for an expectational endogenous variable in models with multi-period expectations can induce misleading implications that are biased toward E-instability.
Introduction
output coefficients estimated by Taylor (1993) ensures E-stability in the representation with no auxiliary variable, whereas in that with the auxiliary variable it induces no E-stable fundamental RE equilibrium when trend inflation is high. This result demonstrates that the different model representations can cause opposite implications of E-stability for monetary policy.
Which model representation is appropriate for E-stability analysis, that with or without auxiliary variables? In both the univariate model and the calibrated versions of the DSGE model, this paper shows that the same E-stability region as in the representation with the auxiliary variable is obtained in that with no such variable if economic agents are assumed to make multiple forecasts in an inconsistent manner. The absence of the consistency in the forecasts makes it more difficult for agents to learn the RE and therefore E-stability is less likely. Because such inconsistent forecasts are problematic, we argue that the introduction of an auxiliary variable as substitute for an expectational endogenous variable in models with multiperiod expectations can induce misleading implications that are biased toward E-instability.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 outlines a pitfall of E-stability analysis using a simple univariate model. Section 3 presents a DSGE model with trend inflation and two representations of the log-linearized model, and analyzes E-stability of a fundamental RE equilibrium. Section 4 concludes.
E-stability Analysis of a Simple Univariate Model
This section outlines the pitfall of E-stability analysis using a simple univariate model with two-period expectations.
The model relates an endogenous variable x t to its one-and two-period-ahead forecastŝ E t x t+1 ,Ê t x t+2 and an exogenous variable u t according to
whereÊ t is a possibly non-RE operator and u t is a white noise. Note that by the Cohn-Schur criterion (see, e.g., LaSalle, 1986) the condition for determinacy of equilibrium in this model consists of |β 2 | < 1 and |β 1 | < 1 − β 2 . The fundamental RE equilibrium is given by
x t =c x +Γ x u t , (c x ,Γ x ) = (0, 1).
Following Section 10.3 of Evans and Honkapohja (2001) , E-stability of the fundamental RE equilibrium is analyzed. Corresponding to this equilibrium, economic agents are assumed to be endowed with the perceived law of motion (PLM) of x t given by x t = c x + Γ x u t . Then, the model implies that the actual law of motion (ALM) of x t is given by x t = (β 1 + β 2 )c x + u t . The mapping T x from the PLM to the ALM can thus be defined as T x (c x , Γ x ) = ((β 1 +β 2 )c x , 1). For the fundamental RE equilibrium (c x ,Γ x ) to be E-stable, the differential equation Hence, the E-stability condition is β 1 + β 2 < 1. 3 Next, we consider an alternative representation of the model (1) using the auxiliary variable ψ t =Ê t x t+1 . The representation is given by 
Note that the determinacy condition for this representation is the same as that for representation (1) . The fundamental RE equilibrium in representation (2) is given by
so that the fundamental RE equilibrium is the same as above. As is similar to E-stability analysis of representation (1) , assuming that the PLM of x 1t is given by x 1,t = c x1 + Γ x1 u t corresponding to the fundamental RE equilibrium (3), the representation (2) yields the ALM of x 1,t given by x 1,t = Ac x1 + Bu t , and thus the mapping T x1 from the PLM to the ALM is defined
. Therefore, it follows that the fundamental RE equilibrium (3) is Estable if and only if all eigenvalues of the matrices
have real parts less than unity. By the Routh-Hurwitz theorem (see, e.g., Samuelson, 1947) , the E-stability condition for representation (2) consists of β 1 < 2 and
The two E-stability conditions for the two representations (1) and (2) imply that the region of the model parameters ensuring E-stability of the fundamental RE equilibrium is smaller in the representation with the auxiliary variable. Moreover, the same E-stability region as in the representation with the auxiliary variable is obtained in that with no such variable if economic agents are assumed to make forecasts in the following inconsistent manner. The model (1) can be rewritten asx
which is the same as representation (2) The remainder of the paper shows that a similar issue as presented in this section can arise in a DSGE model that has been widely used in the recent literature, and that the introduction of an auxiliary variable as substitute for an expectational endogenous variable in the model can induce misleading implications for monetary policy, which are biased toward E-instability.
E-stability Analysis of a DSGE Model with Trend Inflation
This section presents E-stability analysis of a DSGE model with trend inflation. The model is a Calvo (1983)-style sticky price model with the Taylor (1993) rule In the model economy, there are a representative household, two types of firms, and a monetary policymaker. This section describes each agent's behavior in turn.
Representative household
The representative household consumes final goods c t , purchases one-period riskless bonds B t , and supplies labor n t to maximize the utility function E 0
} subject to the budget constraint P t c t + B t = P t w t n t + i t−1 B t−1 + T t , where E t is the RE operator conditional on information available in period t, β ∈ (0, 1) is the subjective discount factor, σ n ≥ 0 is the inverse of the elasticity of labor supply,ũ t is a shock to labor disutility relative to contemporaneous consumption utility, P t is the price of final goods, w t is the real wage, i t is the gross interest rate on bonds, which is assumed to equal the monetary policy rate, and T t consists of lump-sum public transfers and firm profits. The shockũ t is assumed to follow a stationary first-order autoregressive process with the persistence parameter
The first-order conditions for utility maximization with respect to consumption, labor supply, and bond holdings are
where λ t is the marginal utility of consumption and π t = P t /P t−1 is the gross inflation rate of the final-good price. Throughout the section, the trend inflation rate is assumed to be nonnegative, i.e., π ≥ 1.
Firms
There are a representative final-good firm and a continuum of intermediate-good firms j ∈ [0, 1].
The final-good firm produces homogeneous goods y t by choosing a combination of differentiated intermediate inputs {y t (j)} to maximize profit P t y t − 1 0 P t (j)y t (j) dj subject to the CES production technology y t = { 1 0 (y t (j)) (θ−1)/θ dj} θ/(θ−1) , where P t (j) is the price of intermediate good j and θ > 1 is the price elasticity of demand for each intermediate good.
The first-order condition for profit maximization yields the final-good firm's demand curve for intermediate good j
while perfect competition in the final-good market leads to
Each intermediate-good firm j produces one kind of differentiated good y t (j) according to the production function that is linear in labor input n t (j),
The first-order condition for firm j's minimization of production cost shows that real marginal cost is identical among intermediate-good firms and is given by
In the face of the final-good firm's demand curve (8) and the marginal cost (11), intermediategood firms set prices of their products on a staggered basis as in Calvo (1983) . Each period a fraction α ∈ (0, 1) of firms keeps the previous-period prices unchanged, while the remaining fraction 1 − α of firms sets the price P t (j) to maximize the associated profit func-
subect to the demand curve y t+τ |t (i) = y t+τ (P t (j)/P t+τ ) −θ , where q t,t+τ is the stochastic discount factor between period t and period t + τ . For this profit function to be well-defined, it is assumed throughout this section that the condition απ θ < 1 is satisfied.
Using the equilibrium condition q t,t+τ = β τ λ t+τ /λ t , the first-order condition for intermediategood firms that reset prices in period t becomes
where p * t = P * t /P t and P * t is the price reset by the firms. The final-good market clearing condition is given by
The labor market clearing condition, along with the final-good firm's demand curve (8) and intermediate-good firms' production function (10), yields
where s t represents price distortion given by s t = 1 0 (P t (j)/P t ) −θ dj. Under the staggered price setting, this price distortion equation can be reduced to
The final-good price equation (9) can also be reduced to
Monetary policy
The monetary policymaker follows the Taylor (1993) rule
where i is the steady-state gross rate of monetary policy and φ π , φ y ≥ 0 are the degrees of responses of the policy rate (log i t ) to deviations of the inflation rate (log π t ) and output (log y t ) from their steady-state values (log π, log y).
Two representations of the log-linearized model
The equilibrium conditions are given by (5)- (7), (11)- (16), and (17) . Log-linearizing these conditions and rearranging the resulting equations leads to the following two representations of the log-linearized model.
The representation (I) is given bŷ
where hatted variables denote log-deviations from steady-state values and ψ t is an auxiliary The representation (II) consists of (18)- (21), and
The representation of this sort-the one with no auxiliary variable-is used in Kurozumi (2013 Kurozumi ( , 2014 ) and Kurozumi and Van Zandweghe (2012b) . Compared with representation (I), this representation contains two-period-ahead inflation forecast E tπt+2 instead of the auxiliary variable
Note that each of (22) and (24) is a generalized New Keynesian Phillips curve. This is because under the zero trend inflation rate (i.e., π = 1), (23) implies ψ t = 0 and hence (22) becomesπ
On the other hand, (24) becomeŝ
which can be reduced to (25) because 0 < αβ < 1.
The generalized New Keynesian Phillips curve depends on price distortionŝ t through the real marginal cost (20) as long as the elasticity of labor supply is finite (i.e., σ n > 0). Then, under a positive trend inflation rate (i.e., π > 1), the persistence of price distortion described in (21) generates endogenously persistent inflation dynamics. As emphasized by Kurozumi (2014), this endogenous persistence of inflation dynamics through price distortion helps agents learn the RE and as a consequence, a fundamental RE equilibrium is likely to be E-stable in representation (II) under a plausible calibration of the model parameters. Therefore, a positive trend inflation rate and a finite elasticity of labor supply are both key to E-stability of a fundamental RE equilibrium in representation (II).
With the two representations of the log-linearized model presented above, the next sections examine E-stability of a fundamental RE equilibrium.
E-stability condition
Following the literature on learning in macroeconomics (e.g., Evans and Honkapohja, 2001 ), the present paper adopts the so-called "Euler equation" approach suggested by Honkapohja et al. (2011) : the RE operator E t is replaced with a possibly non-RE operatorÊ t in each of the two representations (I) and (II).
By using (20) to eliminate the real marginal cost terms, representation (I) can be rewritten as
where z 1,t = [π tŷtŝt ψ t ] and the coefficient matrix A 1 and the coefficient vector C 1 are given in Appendix A. 6 In this system, a fundamental RE equilibrium is given by
where the coefficient vectorsc 1 ,Φ 1 ,Γ 1 are determined bȳ
Note thatΓ 1 is uniquely determined given aΦ 1 , whereasΦ 1 is not generally uniquely determined, which causes multiplicity of the fundamental RE equilibrium (27) .
Following Section 10.5 of Evans and Honkapohja (2001), E-stability of the fundamental RE equilibrium (27) is investigated. 7 Corresponding to this equilibrium, all agents are assumed to be endowed with the PLM of z 1,t
6 The form of the coefficient vector D1 is omitted, since it is not needed in what follows. 7 The system (26) contains the predetermined endogenous variableŝt−1 and thus it is possible to consider two learning environments, which are studied respectively in Sections 10.3 and 10.5 of Evans and Honkapohja (2001) . One environment allows agents to use current endogenous variables in expectation formation, whereas the other does not. The present paper considers only the latter environment as in Bullard and Mitra (2002), Kurozumi (2006 Kurozumi ( , 2014 , and Van Zandweghe (2008, 2012a) . This is because the former induces a problem with simultaneous determination of expectations and current endogenous variables, which is critical to equilibrium under non-RE as indicated by Evans and Honkapohja (2001) and Bullard and Mitra (2002) .
Using a forecast from this PLM and the relationŝ t = [0 0 1 0]z 1,t to substituteÊ t z 1,t+1 out of (26) leads to the ALM of z 1,t
The mapping T 1 from the PLM (28) to the ALM (29) can thus be defined as
Therefore, a fundamental RE equilibrium (c 1 ,Φ 1 ,Γ 1 ) is E-stable if and only if all eigenvalues of the three matrices
have real parts less than unity. Since
is the third element of the RE equilibrium coefficient vectorΦ 1 , the E-stability condition for a fundamental RE equilibrium (c 1 ,Φ 1 ,Γ 1 ) is that all eigenvalues of the three
} have real parts less than unity.
As for representation (II), it can be written as
where z 2,t = [π tŷtŝt ] and the coefficient matrix A 2 and the coefficient vectors B 2 , C 2 are given in Appendix A. 8 In this system, fundamental RE equilibrium is given by
where the coefficient vectorsc 2 ,Φ 2 ,Γ 2 are determined bȳ
Corresponding to this equilibrium, all agents are assumed to be endowed with the PLM of z 2,t
Using a forecast from this PLM and the relationŝ t = [0 0 1]z 2,t to substituteÊ t z 2,t+1 and E t z 2,t+2 out of the system (30) leads to the ALM of z 2,t
Thus, the mapping T 2 from the PLM (32) to the ALM (33) can be defined as
Consequently, the E-stability condition for a fundamental RE equilibrium (c 2 ,Φ 2 ,Γ 2 ) is that all eigenvalues of the following three matrices have real parts less than unity.
whereΦ 2,3 is the third element of the RE equilibrium coefficient vectorΦ 2 .
For each of the two representations (I) and (II), E-stability of the fundamental RE equilibrium (27) and (31) is numerically investigated, since it seems impossible to analytically solve the matrix equations for the RE equilibrium coefficient vectorsΦ 1 andΦ 2 . As McCallum (1998) indicates, distinct fundamental RE equilibria are obtained for different orderings of stable generalized eigenvalues of the matrix pencil for each of the systems (26) and (30) . Indeed, the calibrations of the model parameters presented below show that in cases of indeterminacy there are two or three distinct fundamental RE equilibrium of the form (27) and (31).
Calibrations of model parameters
The ensuing analysis uses plausible calibrations of the model parameters to illustrate regions of the parameter space in which E-stability of a fundamental RE equilibrium is guaranteed in each of the two representations (I) and (II). The calibrations for the quarterly model are summarized in Table 1 . In line with Ascari and Ropele (2009) and Kurozumi (2014) , the present paper sets the subjective discount factor at β = 0.99, the probability of no price adjustment at α = 0.75, and the price elasticity of demand for differentiated intermediate goods at θ = 11. The assumption of απ θ < 1 then requires that the annualized trend inflation rate does not exceed 11%. As noted above, a positive trend inflation rate is key to E-stability of a fundamental RE equilibrium in representation (II) and thus its annualized rate is set at two, four, six, and eight percent, i.e., π = 1.005, 1.010, 1.015, 1.020. The elasticity of labor supply is also key to the E-stability and thus the inverse of the elasticity of labor supply is set at σ n = 1, 2. 9 The shock persistence is chosen at ρ = 0.8 as in Woodford (2003) and Kurozumi (2014).
Results of E-stability analysis
This subsection shows that representation (I) induces a smaller region of the model parameters that guarantee E-stability of a fundamental RE equilibrium than representation (II), using the calibrations presented in Table 1 . Because the trend inflation rate and the elasticity of labor supply are both key to differences between the two representations as shown below, how the E-stability region of each representation varies with trend inflation is explained in each case of the calibrations of the elasticity.
We begin with the case of the elasticity of labor supply of unity (i.e., σ n = 1). Fig. 1 illustrates the regions of the Taylor rule's coefficients (φ π , φ y ) that ensure E-stability of a fundamental RE equilibrium as well as determinacy of RE equilibrium in representation (I). φ π = 1.5 and φ y = 0.5/4 = 0.125, it is reasonable to set upper bounds on the coefficients at the values three times larger than the estimates. Note that in the region of E-stability at least one E-stable fundamental RE equilibrium is generated, while in the region of E-instability no fundamental RE equilibrium is E-stable. The figure shows that high trend inflation is a serious cause of E-instability of all fundamental RE equilibrium as well as indeterminacy of RE equilibrium. In the case of the annualized trend inflation rate of two percent, the upperleft panel of the figure shows two regions of the Taylor rule's coefficients: one region ensures determinacy and E-stability of RE equilibrium and the other induces indeterminacy of RE equilibrium and E-instability of all fundamental RE equilibrium. The former region is fairly wide and contains the estimates of Taylor (1993) . The boundary between the two regions is given by φ π + y φ y = 1, where
Then, the condition
characterizes the region of the Taylor rule's coefficients that ensure determinacy and E-stability. Therefore, the condition (35) suggests that in the long run the interest rate should be raised by more than the increase in inflation. This Taylor principle (35) restricts the size of the output coefficient more severely under higher trend inflation, since the value of the elasticity y decreases to become negative and further declines as trend inflation rises. For the annualized trend inflation rate less than a threshold (e.g., 2.3% under the calibration of model parameters), the Taylor principle (35) is the relevant, necessary and sufficient condition for determinacy and E-stability, as is similar to the result of Bullard and Mitra (2002) who study the case of the zero trend inflation rate.
As trend inflation increases beyond the threshold, the region of the Taylor rule's coefficients in which E-stability of a fundamental RE equilibrium is ensured narrows remarkably and the one in which determinacy of RE equilibrium is guaranteed further narrows. 10 In the cases of the annualized trend inflation rate of four, six, and eight percent, the Taylor principle (35) is no longer a sufficient condition for E-stability or determinacy, but remains a necessary condition.
Moreover, in the cases of the annualized trend inflation rate of six and eight percent, the Taylor (1993) estimates (i.e., (φ π , φ y ) = (1.5, 0.125)) induce E-instability of all fundamental RE equilibrium as well as indeterminacy of RE equilibrium.
As for representation (II), Fig. 2 illustrates the regions of the Taylor rule's coefficients (φ π , φ y ) that ensure E-stability of a fundamental RE equilibrium as well as determinacy of RE equilibrium. The comparison of this figure with Fig. 1 shows that determinacy of RE equilibrium is identical between the two representations (I) and (II), but E-stability of a fundamental RE equilibrium is more likely in representation (II). For annualized trend inflation rates less than the threshold (e.g., 2.3%), the E-stability region is identical to that in representation (I), as shown in the upper-left panel where the rate is two percent. However, once the rate increases beyond the threshold, the E-stability region differs from that in representation (I). In particular, when the rate rises, the E-stability region narrows much less than that in representation (I), as shown in the cases of the annualized trend inflation rate of four, six, and eight percent.
We emphasize two policy implications generated under representation (II), as they differ importantly from the implications under representation (I). First, the Taylor (1993) estimates (i.e., (φ π , φ y ) = (1.5, 0.125)) lead to E-stability even in the cases of the annualized trend inflation rate of six and eight percent. Therefore, a fundamental RE equilibrium is likely to be E-stable even under high trend inflation. Second, in these cases the Taylor principle (35) is neither a sufficient condition nor a necessary condition for E-stability. 11 This contrasts with representation (I), where the Taylor principle (35) remains a necessary condition for E-stability even under high trend inflation.
We turn next to the case of the elasticity of labor supply of one half (i.e., σ n = 2). (32)), the endogenous persistence of inflation dynamics through price distortion helps agents learn the RE. Consequently, E-stability of a fundamental RE equilibrium is likely. 12 The next subsection explains why this does not hold for representation (I).
Why does representation (I) induce a smaller E-stability region than representation (II)?
This subsection addresses the question of why representation (I) induces a smaller E-stability region than representation (II) as illustrated above. Specifically, the subsection demonstrates that in representation (II), if economic agents make inflation forecasts in an inconsistent manner, the resulting E-stability region becomes identical with that in representation (I).
The system of representation (II) given by (30) can be rewritten as
where z 3,t = [z 2,tÊ tπt+1 ] (= [π tŷtŝtÊtπt+1 ] ) and the coefficient matrix A 3 and the coefficient vectors C 3 , D 3 are given by
In this system, fundamental RE equilibrium is given by
where the coefficient vectorsc 3 ,Φ 3 ,Γ 3 are determined bȳ
Corresponding to this equilibrium, all agents are assumed to be endowed with the PLM of z 3,t
In this PLM the fourth element iŝ
where c 3,4 , Φ 3,4 , and Γ 3,4 are the fourth elements of the vectors c 3 , Φ 3 , and Γ 3 . The forecast E t z 3,t+1 based on the PLM (38) is given bŷ
The first element of this forecast,Ê tπt+1 , is not consistent with (39). Thus, because agents have a PLM for contemporaneous inflation and one for expected inflation next period, they make multiple inflation forecasts in an inconsistent manner. Using the forecastÊ t z 3,t+1 , the system (36) yields the ALM of z 3,t
Thus, the mapping T 3 from the PLM (38) to the ALM (40) can be defined as
Consequently, the E-stability condition for a fundamental RE equilibrium (c 3 ,Φ 3 ,Γ 3 ) is that all eigenvalues of the following three matrices have real parts less than unity.
whereΦ 3,3 is the third element of the RE equilibrium coefficient vectorΦ 3 .
Under the calibrations of the model parameters presented in Table 1 , this E-stability condition generates the same figures as those for representation (I), i.e., Figs. 1 and 3 in the cases of σ n = 1, 2. Therefore, in representation (II), if economic agents make inflation forecasts in the aforementioned inconsistent manner, the resulting E-stability region becomes identical with that in representation (I). 13 Because the absence of the consistency in the inflation forecasts is problematic, representation (I) is arguably not appropriate for E-stability analysis.
Concluding Remarks
This paper has shown that a pitfall of E-stability analysis can arise in models with multi- 
Appendix
A Coefficient matrix and vectors of systems (26) and (30)
In the system (26), the coefficient matrix A 1 and the coefficient vector C 1 are given by 
where
In the system (30), the coefficient matrix A 2 and the coefficient vectors B 2 , C 2 are given by 
B The case of an infinite elasticity of labor supply
In the case of an infinite elasticity of labor supply (i.e., σ n = 0), the E-stability conditions for the representations (I) and (II) presented in Section 3.5 generate Figs. 5 and 6 under the calibrations of the other model parameters presented in Table 1 . In line with the cases of σ n = 1, 2, these figures show that E-stability of a fundamental RE equilibrium is more likely in representation (II) than in representation (I). Note that in the case of σ n = 0, the Taylor principle (35) is a necessary condition for E-stability as well as determinacy even in representation (II).
In representation (II), if economic agents make inflation forecasts in the inconsistent manner mentioned in Section 3.8, the resulting E-stability region becomes identical with that in representation (I). This is shown in the following proposition. 
